Jury Selection and Race in the United States

At some point students in most of my courses are introduced to the method used in the United States to select juries, a method that basically gives advocates a limited number of "objections" to potential jurors. These objections take the form of peremptory challenges and can be used by advocates to remove potential jurors from the jury pool for any reason . . . except for the wrong reason. In the Batson case the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that a "wrong reason" included removing a potential juror because of race. As Garrett Epps of the Atlantic writes, proving that race is a factor in the removal of a potential juror has been difficult and now is the focus of case being heard today by the Court:

Since 1986, the Court has extended that rule to peremptory challenges by defendants as well as prosecutors; to peremptory challenges of potential jurors even if they are of a different race as the defendant; to peremptory challenges based on sex as well as race; and to peremptory challenges in civil, as well as criminal, cases. Batson, thus, is a landmark—though at best a confusing one. That confusion may be on display next week, when the Supreme Court takes up a jury-selection case that is literally a matter of life and death. Foster v. Chatman tests how strong the evidence of racial motive must be in a jury selection case before a defendant can prevail on the issue.

Students are strongly encouraged to read Epp's wonderful summary of the case that also includes a little of the history concerning the use of peremptory challenges by common law courts. Along these same lines a piece in Slate by Mark Stern and an opinion piece in the New York Times by former United States Deputy Attorney General for the Bush Administration Larry Thompson are also worth reading.